The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

To prevent landlords under long-term real property leases from reaping a windfall for future rent claims at the expense of other creditors, the Bankruptcy Code caps the amount of a landlord's claim against a debtor-tenant for damages "resulting from the termination" of a real property lease.

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the scope of the provision, including its limitation to transactions involving "financial institutions" as transferors or transferees, its preemption of avoidance litigation that could have been commenced by or on behalf of creditors under applicable non-bankruptcy law, and its application to non-public transactions.

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

One of the fundamental goals of a chapter 11 bankruptcy is the maximization of value available for distribution to creditors. The "absolute priority rule" generally applicable in chapter 11 requires that each class of impaired and unaccepting creditors be paid in full before any junior class of claims or interests may receive distributions under the plan. Courts recognize a limited exception to the absolute priority rule, however, allowing prepetition shareholders to retain their interest in the debtor where they contribute new value toward the debtor's reorganization.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

In a 2021 ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived nearly 100 lawsuits seeking to recover fraudulent transfers made as part of the Madoff Ponzi scheme. In one of the latest chapters in that resurrected litigation, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held in Picard v. ABN AMRO Bank NV (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC), 654 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL