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目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言,破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中,投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等,其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式(其基本流程如下图),本文将结合实践,从投资人视角,浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范,以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。

图1:破产重整中股权投资基本流程图

一、重整投资的机遇

现阶段,重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例,2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1];2024年以来,截至11月,有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整,较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见,破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会,其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

近年来,越来越多的企业面临债务困境,由于该等企业较多成立时间久、体量巨大,且存在经营多元化、债权债务形式多样化的情形,企业资金链的断裂易引发债务风险,实践中迫切需要进行债务重组,使债权人得到受偿,让企业重获新生。从目前情况来看,信托工具越来越多地被应用于债务重组中,包括在破产重整前的债务重组阶段,也包括在破产重整阶段。根据中国信托业协会于2022年12月12日发布的《2022年3季度中国信托业发展评析》,截至2022年3季度末,我国信托资产规模余额约为21.07万亿元。另根据建信信托有限责任公司(“建信信托”)发布的《建信信托2021年年度报告》,截至2021年12月31日,建信信托破产重整服务信托规模超2,300亿元[1];根据中信信托有限责任公司(“中信信托”)发布的《中信信托二〇二一年年度报告》,截至2021年12月31日,中信信托特殊资产服务信托业务受托规模近160亿元[2]。

To promote the finality and binding effect of confirmed chapter 11 plans, the Bankruptcy Code categorically prohibits any modification of a confirmed plan after it has been "substantially consummated." Stakeholders, however, sometimes attempt to skirt this prohibition by characterizing proposed changes to a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan as some other form of relief, such as modification of the confirmation order or a plan document, or reconsideration of the allowed amount of a claim. The U.S.

One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.

One year ago, we wrote that the large business bankruptcy landscape in 2019 was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, with notable exceptions for disastrous wildfires, liabilities arising from the opioid crisis, price-fixing fallout, and corporate restructuring shenanigans.

The year 2020 was a different story altogether. The headline was COVID-19.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to use "cash collateral" during the course of a bankruptcy case may be vital to the debtor's prospects for a successful reorganization. However, because of the unique nature of cash collateral, the Bankruptcy Code sets forth special rules that apply to the nonconsensual use of such collateral to protect the interests of the secured creditor involved. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington examined these requirements in In re Claar Cellars, LLC, 2020 WL 1238924 (Bankr. E.D.