The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

企业出现债务危机后，可能最终不得不走向破产清算的结局。通常而言，处于债务危机中的企业已存在无偿债能力（insolvent）的情况，不能藉由公司自行注销的程序完成注销公司；否则，未经清盘程序注销的公司有可能仍被债权人申请恢复，并继续追索债务，届时会给公司股东或董事带来不必要的麻烦。相应地，虽然清盘后解散的公司在法律上仍有可能被恢复，但仅限于清盘过程中遗漏重大债权或资产的情况等，通常不会出现这种情况。

根据《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（香港条例第32章）第169条，香港公司清盘方式可分为两大类：第一类是由法院强制清盘；第二类是自愿清盘，而自愿清盘又可以分为股东自愿清盘与债权人自愿清盘两种。各路径均能令香港公司清盘，并在彻底厘清与处理资产及债务情况下宣告公司解散。本文为上篇，将简要介绍香港公司清盘的程序。

一、股东自愿清盘

股东自愿清盘是指公司可以自行由股东会进行特别决议，或董事会层面作出决议，宣布公司进行清盘，并委任清盘人进行清盘程序。根据《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（香港条例第32章）第228条、229条和233条的要求，董事需要在清盘决议前的5个星期内发出一份《有偿债能力证明书》，说明董事已经详细地调查过公司事务，并认为在未来12个月内能够还清各项债务。

在各类跨境投资的项目中，投资人最担心的问题莫过于被投企业的财务状况出现困境，影响其持续经营能力和偿债能力并最终演变为债务危机，或者集团的持股结构、治理结构不够透明，各种交叉持股盘根错节。在重组过程中，投资者可能会帮助公司梳理、调整各种投资主体架构，而企业为了解除投资者顾虑，有时也会主动进行投资主体架构的重组和优化，包括把多余的主体和结构层级精简掉。

在跨境投资的架构中，往往涉及到多层持股架构，开曼公司、BVI公司以及香港公司都是常见的持股主体。如果我们在重组中需要把这些主体精简注销，需要走什么样的程序，复杂不复杂？在本文中，我们将与大家分享开曼豁免有限公司的清盘和解散，并且后续文章中陆续与大家分享其他法域主体的清算和注销。

To promote the finality and binding effect of confirmed chapter 11 plans, the Bankruptcy Code categorically prohibits any modification of a confirmed plan after it has been "substantially consummated." Stakeholders, however, sometimes attempt to skirt this prohibition by characterizing proposed changes to a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan as some other form of relief, such as modification of the confirmation order or a plan document, or reconsideration of the allowed amount of a claim. The U.S.

One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.

Introduction
Business Bankruptcy Filings
Public Company Bankruptcies
Notable Bankruptcy Rulings
Legislative Developments

One year ago, we wrote that the large business bankruptcy landscape in 2019 was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, with notable exceptions for disastrous wildfires, liabilities arising from the opioid crisis, price-fixing fallout, and corporate restructuring shenanigans.

The year 2020 was a different story altogether. The headline was COVID-19.

Use, sale or lease of estate property outside ordinary course
Special rules for use of cash collateral
Jevic and distributions inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme
Claar Cellars
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to use "cash collateral" during the course of a bankruptcy case may be vital to the debtor's prospects for a successful reorganization. However, because of the unique nature of cash collateral, the Bankruptcy Code sets forth special rules that apply to the nonconsensual use of such collateral to protect the interests of the secured creditor involved. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington examined these requirements in In re Claar Cellars, LLC, 2020 WL 1238924 (Bankr. E.D.