The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) to sell bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear” of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of “any interest in such property,” has generated a fair amount of controversy.

In 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, which grants some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property notwithstanding rejection of the underlying executory license agreement by a debtor or bankruptcy trustee. The addition came three years after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), that if a debtor rejects an executory intellectual property license, the licensee loses the right to use any licensed copyrights, trademarks, and patents.

In an important recent decision, United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., et al.,1 in which Pepper represented the prevailing party, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (SUB payments) paid by a bankrupt company to its former employees were not wages subject to taxation under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).

In In reAm. Capital Equip., LLC¹ the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether a bankruptcy court has the authority to determine at the disclosure statement stage that a Chapter 11 plan is unconfirmable without holding a confirmation hearing. The court held that when a plan is patently unconfirmable, so that no dispute of material fact remains and defects cannot be cured by creditor voting, a bankruptcy court is authorized to convert the case to Chapter 7 without holding a confirmation hearing. Am.

Participants in the multibillion-dollar market for distressed claims and securities have had ample reason to keep a watchful eye on developments in the bankruptcy courts during the last decade. That vigil appeared to have been over five years ago, after a federal district court ruled in the Enron chapter 11 cases that sold claims are generally not subject to equitable subordination or disallowance on the basis of the seller's misconduct or receipt of a voidable transfer. A ruling recently handed down by a Delaware bankruptcy court, however, has reignited the debate.

In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that debtors may not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 cramdown plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of a creditor’s lien but does not permit the creditor to credit-bid at the sale. InRadlax Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued an important decision on the valuation of collateral of secured creditors and “lien-stripping” in Chapter 11 cases. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc.,¹ the court held that in a Chapter 11 case, the value of a secured creditor’s collateral under §506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code² was the fair market value of the property as established by expert testimony and it was permissible to “strip the lien” of the creditor where it was unsupported by collateral value.

A "roller-coaster ride of financial and economic uncertainty" would be one way to describe 2011. Limiting the script to financial and economic developments, however, would leave a big part of the story untold, as we chronicle the (not so certain) aftermath of the Great Recession. Impacting worldwide financial and economic affairs in 2011 was a seemingly endless series of groundbreaking, thought-provoking, and sometimes cataclysmic events, including:

Much attention in the commercial bankruptcy world has been devoted recently to judicial pronouncements concerning whether the practice of senior creditor class “gifting” to junior classes under a chapter 1 1 plan violates the Bankruptcy Code’s “absolute priority rule.” Comparatively little scrutiny, by contrast, has been directed toward significant developments in ongoing controversies in the courts regarding the absolute priority rule outside the realm of senior class gifting— namely, in connection with the “new value” exception to the rule and whether the rule was written out of the Bankr

The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.

Root of the Constitutional Problem