In the wake of scandal-driven bankruptcies filed by nearly 20 U.S. Roman Catholic dioceses and religious orders, scrutiny has been increasingly brought to bear on the benefits and burdens that federal bankruptcy laws offer to eleemosynary (nonprofit) corporations. Nonprofits seek bankruptcy protection for a variety of reasons.

For a vast number of professionals, email has become the preferred method for communicating and conducting business. However, many of those people who would choose to fire off a quick email over picking up a phone may not be aware that a casual email can transform into a binding, enforceable contract. Such was the case for the parties in Shinhan Bank v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.), Case No. 17-2700, 2018 WL 3469004 (2d Cir.

As an officer of the court every attorney is held accountable to the standards set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct. In bankruptcy court, attorneys are held to additional standards set forth in local bankruptcy law. A violation of the rules can result in harsh sanctions as attorney Richard Gates discovered in In re Gates, Misc. Case No. 18-00301-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2018).

InIn re Blasingame, 2018 WL 2084789 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. May 3, 2018), the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel demonstrates that trusts can be used to protect assets from the reach of creditors in the context of a bankruptcy.

In U.S. Capital Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, No. 15-1509 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an appellate court should apply a deferential standard of review to a bankruptcy court's decision as to whether a creditor is a "nonstatutory" insider. Nonstatutory insiders are creditors who are not specifically designated as insiders under the Bankruptcy Code (such as officers, directors, and controlling shareholders), but who the bankruptcy court determines nonetheless have sufficient influence over a debtor to be deemed insiders.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a highly anticipated ruling resolving a long-standing circuit split over the scope of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" provision exempting certain securities transaction payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers. In Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., the unanimous Court held that section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not protect transfers made through a financial institution to a third party regardless of whether the financial institution had a beneficial interest in the transferred property.

The initial year of the Trump administration colored much of the political, business, and financial headlines of 2017, both in the U.S. and abroad. Key administration-related developments in 2017 included U.S. withdrawal from the Paris climate accord; decertification of the Iranian nuclear deal; steps to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement; the continued investigation of Russian election interference; the showdown with North Korea over nuclear weapons; U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; and the largest U.S.

Delaware District Judge Leonard P. Stark has seemingly split with the Second Circuit and held that the safe harbor in Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not bar fraudulent transfer claims brought on behalf of creditors under state law, ratifying a June 2016 opinion from Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross.

In bankruptcy, one of the “powers” granted to a trustee is the ability to undo previously completed transactions in order to facilitate payments to creditors. However, the Bankruptcy Code prevents a trustee from unwinding certain types of transactions. The safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) protects financial institutions performing securities transactions from having to disgorge payments initially made by a now bankrupt company.

In Varela v. AE Liquidation, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), 866 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the sixth circuit court of appeals to rule that a "probability standard" applies in determining whether an employer is relieved from giving 60 days’ advance notice to employees of a mass layoff under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (the "WARN Act").