British universities facing financial challenges and shifting enrollment patterns are considering restructuring plans in light of potential insolvencies.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

On 11 June 2024, Mr. Justice Leech handed down a landmark UK judgment relating to wrongful trading and misfeasance against the former directors of the BHS Group of companies (BHS) pursuant to the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA86).

The 533-page judgment saw one of the largest reported wrongful trading awards since the introduction of IA86, as well as a novel claim for “misfeasant trading.”

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

On 4 March 2024, Mr Justice Richards of the English High Court delivered a judgment (the Judgment) in relation to the sanction of the restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (the Plan) of Project Lietzenburger Straße HoldCo S.à r.l. (the Plan Company). The Judgment required that a new creditors’ meeting of the Plan Company’s senior creditors be convened to vote on an amended Plan.

To modernise the restructuring toolkit available to special administrators, the UK government has introduced changes to the English special administration regime (SAR)1 for distressed water companies. The changes follow reports of significant stress in the water services sector.

New Changes

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.