In the recent decision of FamilyMart China Holding Co v Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corporation [2023] UKPC 33 (FamilyMart),[1] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (the Board) found that, although an arbitral tribunal does not have the power to determine whether it is just and equitable to wind up a company nor to make a winding u
In a comprehensive judgment published on 23 April 2020, the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal, comprising Moses JA, Martin JA and Rix JA, has provided welcome clarification of the interplay between a contractual agreement to arbitrate disputes arising between shareholders and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to determine whether a company should be wound up on the just and equitable ground.
The Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., holding that “Section 316(b) prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms.” At issue is whether the phrase “right . . . to receive payment” forecloses “more than formal amendments to payment terms that eliminate the right to sue for payment.” The Second Circuit held that it does not.
Since Marblegate was decided in 2014, the only court to address claims under §316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in the context of a corporate restructuring transaction is
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. on May 12, 2016. One might have thought from the courtroom’s overflow crowd that it was the opening argument in a mob trial, but this is a case about a bond indenture. At issue is whether an out-of-court debt restructuring that did not amend the indenture’s principal and interest terms, but that effectively precluded the noteholders’ ability to be repaid, violated § 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).