Most restructuring professionals will tell you that there is no “typical” restructuring. That is absolutely true. Every financially distressed business is different and the character and direction of its restructuring will be highly dependent upon, among others, its capital structure, its liquidity profile, and the level of support it can build for its reorganization among key stakeholder bodies. Nevertheless, there are some important similarities in the way that any company should initially address a distressed situation.
The oil and gas industry in Texas is currently facing a double whammy from the recent oil price shock and COVID-19 related demand reductions. While exploration and production operators in Texas are proactively taking self-help measures to reinforce their financial frameworks — reducing capital spending, operating expenses, overhead and dividends — the outlook remains highly uncertain.
The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.
In recent years, it has become common practice in large chapter 11 cases for debtors to include language in their proposed chapter 11 plan which purports to release certain nondebtors from the claims of third parties. Although some third parties may consent to the release—such as by voting in favor of the plan or otherwise electing to do so during the plan solicitation process—circumstances frequently arise in which the debtors seek approval from the bankruptcy court to release nondebtors from third parties’ claims without the consent of the third parties.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).
The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.
In a recent opinion – In re Heritage Home Group LLC, et al., Case No. 18-11736 (KG), 2018 WL 4684802 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 27, 2018) – the Delaware Bankruptcy Court addressed the longstanding issue of which professional persons must be retained under section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.
The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.
A fundamental tenet of chapter 11 bankruptcies is the absolute priority rule. Initially a judge-created doctrine, the absolute priority rule was partially codified in section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. Under section 1129, plans must be “fair and equitable” in order to be confirmed.