The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

Before ingesting too much holiday cheer, we encourage you to consider a recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Weil Bankruptcy Blog connoisseurs will recall that, in May 2019, we wrote on the Southern District of New York’s decision in In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, Case No. 12-2652, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019) (Cote, J.) (“Tribune I”).

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

A recent decision from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, Case No. 12-2652, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019) (Cote, J.), has re-examined application of the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, to the transferees of “financial institutions” in so-called “conduit transactions,” following the United States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883 (2018).

In a recent opinion – In re Heritage Home Group LLC, et al., Case No. 18-11736 (KG), 2018 WL 4684802 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 27, 2018) – the Delaware Bankruptcy Court addressed the longstanding issue of which professional persons must be retained under section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

In re Katy Indus., Inc., 590 B.R. 628 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) presented an interesting question: If a stalking horse bidder’s successful bid to purchase a company in chapter 11 was partially predicated upon a credit bid, and a portion of that credit bid was challenged after the sale closed, what would be the result for the bidder’s overall successful bid if that portion of the credit bid was eliminated?

Background

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.

A fundamental tenet of chapter 11 bankruptcies is the absolute priority rule. Initially a judge-created doctrine, the absolute priority rule was partially codified in section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. Under section 1129, plans must be “fair and equitable” in order to be confirmed.