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Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.

在中国,破产法一直是一个有趣的实践和研究的领域。自从社会主义市场经济被写入我国宪法,我国就允许私营企业在定期不断重新界定的范围内相对自由地经营,同时约占整个经济一半的国有企业也展现出其雄厚的实力。在这个拥有14亿人口的国家,社会稳定问题一直备受关注,因此企业破产制度必须在资本主义“允许失败的自由”原则和政府对经济的管控之间保持谨慎的平衡。

中国的破产法从业人员一直热切期待新的并且能够对公司何时以及如何进行破产清算与重整产生影响的法律法规出台。中华人民共和国第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议于2023年12月29日审议并通过了新修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》(简称“新公司法”),将自2024年7月1日起正式实施。本文将从破产实务的角度对新公司法进行解读。

Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.

Among the many protections afforded creditors under the Bankruptcy Code is the estate’s ability to avoid transfers made before the petition date that benefit certain creditors at the expense of others. These so-called avoidance actions are primarily governed by Sections 544, 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which set forth the requirements for challenging prepetition transfers as preferential or fraudulent.

Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) and Key Employee Incentive Plans (KEIPs) often are the subject of intense interest, either because a distressed company’s management is focused on developing such programs to retain valuable talent during a time of great uncertainty within its organization or because certain creditor constituencies or parties in interest take issue with the payments a debtor intends to make under the programs.

What happens when the counterparties on both sides of a contract are debtors in separate bankruptcy cases and their estates have contrary views about whether to reject or assume a contract?

As avid blog readers know, we’ve posted extensively on make whole issues, including several articles covering the ongoing make whole litigations in the chapter 11 cases of Energy Future Holdings and its affiliated debtors, which can be found here

Are you feeling a bit of déjà vu?  We certainly are.  As readers know, here at the Weil Bankruptcy Blog we’ve written extensively about make-wholes.  In two previous posts, What the Future Holds for Make-Whole Claims in Bankruptcy: Examining the Energy Future Holdings EFIH First Lien Make-Whole Decision –