Despite recent criticisms of venue selection and cries to limit or curtail various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York demonstrates that the bankruptcy courts may continue to broadly interpret the scope of their jurisdictional reach and the powers and authorities granted to them under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re JPA No. 111 Co., Ltd., No. 21-12075 (DSJ) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.

Overview

Overview

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.

Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code grants secured creditors the right to credit bid up to the full amount of their claim as a form of currency to bid to purchase assets securing their claim from a debtor in connection with a stand-alone sale of assets under section 363(b). In a recent opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Aerogroup International, Inc., Judge Kevin J.

The Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions are a powerful tool for debtors in the plan confirmation process. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan may be confirmed if, among other things, “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.” Once there is an impaired accepting class, and assuming certain requirements are met, the plan may then be “crammed down” on all other classes of impaired creditors that reject the plan and those creditors will be bound by the terms of a plan they rejected.