Courts Begin to Wrestle with the Impact of on a Debtor’s Ability to Recover Estate Property

Executive Summary

Bankruptcy courts often dismiss appeals of chapter 11 plans when granting the relief requested in the appeal would undermine the finality and reliability of the corresponding plans, a doctrine known as Equitable Mootness. Over the past several years, certain circuits criticized the doctrine for its lack of statutory basis and effect of avoiding review on the merits.¹

In January 2020, we analyzed a split among the Circuit Courts regarding whether a non-debtor holding a debtor’s property on the petition date has an affirmative obligation under section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code to return that property to the debtor immediately following the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

When a court reaches a decision in a case, the law of the case doctrine generally provides that parties should not be able to relitigate the same issue in that case, and for the court to adhere to its prior decision.1 The doctrine does not, however, apply to every decision a court reaches. Two recent decisions by Judge Elizabeth Stong in the Brizinova chapter 7 cases in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York explore when the doctrine may or may not apply in bankruptcy cases.

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.