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Borrower beware: in times of distress, your credit documents may give your secured lenders an opportunity to “flip” control of your board

Distress happens, even at companies that once appeared financially solid. When it does, the company, its board (which may be controlled by a sponsor in a public or private equity scenario), and its lenders often enter into restructuring discussions in search of a consensual path forward, typically under the terms of a forbearance agreement.

Over the past several years, unitranche facilities have become increasingly prevalent. This growth has been driven by the ever-growing class of private credit and direct lenders who initially developed the unitranche facility structure, along with traditional bank lenders now joining this market. The unitranche structure has several advantages, including typically quicker execution for the parties involved and in some cases a lower cost of capital to the borrower.

Bed Bath & Beyond, the home goods retailer, has filed bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and plans to conduct liquidation sales and close all of its brick-and-mortar stores by June 30, as reported by The New York Times. The retailer points to an inability to adjust to the growth of online shopping as a reason for its downfall.

On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

Whether—and in what circumstances—a debtor should pay creditors a make-whole premium continues to be litigated in bankruptcy courts. Last week, as reported by Bloomberg, Judge Dorsey (Delaware) ruled that the debtor – Mallinckrodt Plc – did not need to pay a make whole premium to first lien lenders in order to reinstate such obligations under the debtor’s chapter 11 plan.

In a March 2021 decision in the jointly administered bankruptcy cases of Fencepost Productions, Inc. and certain of its affiliates, Judge Dale L.

The holidays came early for the United States Trustee (the “U.S. Trustee”) on November, 3, 2020, when a three-judge panel of the United States Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit, on direct appeal, reversed the bankruptcy court and upheld the constitutionality of a 2017 increase to quarterly fees payable to the U.S. Trustee in Hobbs v. Buffets LLC (In re Buffets LLC), No. 19-50765, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34866 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2020). Although the Fifth Circuit’s opinion addresses a variety of constitutional challenges to the recent increase to U.S.