In a recent decision, In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 18-10518 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the mutuality requirement of section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed, declining to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.

During this mostly quiet week in restructuring, most of us are either away on vacation (think beach or ski) or home for the holidays, maybe back in our hometowns. For me, it’s always the latter, and home for the holidays is Virginia Beach, Virginia, where I sit while I write this blog post (alas, not the beach vacation some of you may be enjoying; my relatives live about 20 minutes from the beach and the high temperature this time of year is usually in the 40s).

In Judge Glenn’s recent lengthy decision recognizing and enforcing a restructuring plan in the chapter 15 proceedings of In re Agrokor1, a Croatian company in Croatian insolvency proceedings, he highlighted that the concept of comity – respect for rulings in other countries – remains an important U.S.

If you were to walk down Fifth Avenue and see a store displaying a white apple suspended in a large glass case, more likely than not you would immediately think of the California-based tech giant who shares its name with the nutritious snack. Similarly, if the person walking in front of you on your way to the Apple store lifted her heel to reveal a candy-apple red shoe sole, more likely than not the name Christian Louboutin would pop into your head.

In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit narrowly held that federal law does not prevent a bona fide shareholder from exercising its voting right in the company’s charter to prevent the filing by the company of a bankruptcy petition merely because it is also an unsecured creditor. In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 2018).

It’s been an interesting couple of weeks for bankruptcy at the United States Supreme Court with two bankruptcy-related decisions released in back-to-back weeks. Last week, the Supreme Court issued an important decision delineating the scope of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code (discussed here [1] for those who missed it).

On 28 March 2017, the Enactment of Extra-Statutory Concessions Order 2017[3] was made which, amongst other things, enacts ESC3.20. The Order came into force on 6 April 2017.

ESC3.20 disapplied the clawback of input tax credit for an insolvent business that has not paid (or not fully paid) the consideration for a supply. New section 26AA of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 gives broadly the same effect as ESC3.20 in that it “turns off” the disallowance of input tax in cases of non-payment of consideration if:

On 11 October 2016, the High Court10 held that statutory interest payable on an insolvency (under rule 2.88(7) IR 1986) is not “yearly interest” for UK tax purposes. Such statutory interest is therefore not subject to UK withholding tax (20%).

The facts of the case are somewhat unusual in that there was a substantial surplus in the administration and the statutory interest was estimated at £5bn. However the decision is a welcome clarification of the position. It also confirms HMRC’s previous guidance on the taxation of statutory interest (subsequently withdrawn).

On 29 November 2016, the First-tier Tribunal9 held that the issue of growth shares to certain key employees had inadvertently caused an existing class of ordinary shares to carry a preferential right to assets on a winding up. The effect of this was that both prior ordinary share issues, and future share issues, failed to meet the requirement of the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) rules.

On 17 June 2016, the First-tier Tribunal (in Farnborough Airport Properties Ltd v HMRC²) held that the appointment of a receiver over a (would-be surrendering) group company meant that “arrangements” were in place for the company to no longer be under the same “control” as would-be claimant group companies.