In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.
Introduction
What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?
A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.
A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.
The issue of whether directors, officers, and/or shareholders breached their fiduciary duties to a company prior to bankruptcy is commonly litigated in chapter 11 cases, as creditors look to additional sources for recovery, such as D&O insurance or “deep-pocket” shareholders, including private equity firms. The recent decision in In re AMC Investors, LLC, 637 B.R. 43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022) provides a helpful reminder of the importance of timing in bringing such claims and the use by defendants of affirmative defenses to defeat those claims.
根据测算，截止2022年年初，国内烂尾项目规模已经超过2万亿，随着2021年大型房地产公司接连“暴雷”，势必会产生更多的烂尾或接近烂尾的项目。对于商业逻辑自洽的单体项目破产重组，借助破产清算或重整程序分兵突围势必成为地方政府主导重整的最优路径。但是鉴于目前的房地产市场行情以及烂尾项目续建的特点，大部分重整投资人，尤其是财务投资类型的重整投资人更倾向于采用固定收益的方式进行项目重整，既能实现维护稳定的社会效果，又能最大限度地保证投资安全。因此，如何在当前法律架构下保障固定收益重整投资人的利益是本文中讨论的主要问题。
一 重整投资人的收益模式对比
重整投资人参与烂尾项目的收益模式大致可以分为固定收益模式、风险收益模式和固定加风险收益模式。不同的收益模式下重整投资人有不同的投资逻辑，也有不同的退出模式。我们从投入、收益、风险以及安全性角度对固定收益模式与风险收益模式进行了比较。
（一）固定收益模式
固定收益模式的特点是重整投资人投入重整资金，约定固定收益率，在最终财产变现所得中优先收回投资本金及收益，项目剩余资产全部用于债权清偿。
There is a common misconception that lender liability is a thing of the past. However, a recent decision provides a warning to lenders that they can be held liable and face substantial damages if they exercise excessive control over a debtor’s business affairs.
There is a common misconception that lender liability is a thing of the past. However, a recent decision provides a warning to lenders that they can be held liable and face substantial damages if they exercise excessive control over a debtor’s business affairs.
In an opinion that mostly flew under the radar in 2021, Judge Christopher Sontchi from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) found investment firm Yucaipa American Alliance Fund I, L.P. and Yucaipa American Alliance (Parallel) Fund I, L.P.