In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

The Bankruptcy Code’s Section 547(b) allows a trustee or debtor in possession to recover property transferred to a creditor, known as a preference action. However, the Code also provides defenses to a preference action, including the ordinary course of business defense.

A Section 363 sale is a sale of a company's assets pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court will approve a 363 sale if the debtor can demonstrate a "substantial business justification" for the sale.

Key Issues

In general, Section 363 bankruptcy sales proceed as follows:

This article, part of our Creditor’s Rights Toolkit [link] series, serves as an essential guide for vendors navigating the complex landscape of dealing with financially distressed or bankrupt customers. It provides a detailed exploration of the options available to vendors who are proactive and quick to act when they learn of their customer’s financial woes.

Successor liability is a catchall term for a group of legal theories that, in certain circumstances, allow a creditor to recover amounts owed by its obligor from a person or entity who succeeds to the assets or business of that obligor. Typically, claimants cannot pursue successor liability against a purchaser in a bankruptcy sale because most sales are made "free and clear" of such claims under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, there are some limited exceptions to this general rule.

Introduction

On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.