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A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

On September 20, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California (“Court”) confirmed a plan for a cannabis-related business (“Debtor”) to sell its equity interests in a Canadian cannabis company, Lowell Farms, and distribute the proceeds to its creditors.

As the cannabis industry matures, there will be winners and losers. Losers lack access to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Marijuana related assets cannot be sold free and clear of liens and encumbrances via the tried and true bankruptcy section 363 sale, which leaves the loser’s creditors without the best tool to maximize the value of the loser’s assets, and deprives acquirers of a federal court order conveying assets. What’s the state of play, and what’s the alternative for the losers, their creditors, and the companies that would acquire them?

STATE OF PLAY

In Short

The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.

Bank Asset Auction: Bids for Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. (“SVB”) and its subsidiary Silicon Valley Private Bank, together or separately, in whole or in part, are due by Wednesday, March 22, 2023 at 8 p.m. and Friday, March 24, 2023 at 8 p.m. We’ve previously reported that SVB is open for operations for a minimum of ninety days until it is sold or liquidated.

The FDIC has statutory obligations to maximize the net present value return from the sale or disposition of the assets entrusted to it as receiver, and to minimize the amount of any loss realized.[1] Today we examine the FDIC’s efforts to fulfill its mandate through the transfer of assets to bridge-banks, Silicon Valley Bank, N.A. (“SVB”) and Signature Bank, N.A. (“SB”).

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?