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Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the equitable remedy of "substantive consolidation"—i.e., treating the assets and liabilities of two or more related entities as if they belonged to a single, consolidated bankruptcy estate. However, it is well recognized that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order such relief under appropriate circumstances in the exercise of its broad equitable powers when each of the original entities are already debtors subject to the court's jurisdiction.

To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?

A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.

A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.

The issue of whether directors, officers, and/or shareholders breached their fiduciary duties to a company prior to bankruptcy is commonly litigated in chapter 11 cases, as creditors look to additional sources for recovery, such as D&O insurance or “deep-pocket” shareholders, including private equity firms. The recent decision in In re AMC Investors, LLC, 637 B.R. 43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022) provides a helpful reminder of the importance of timing in bringing such claims and the use by defendants of affirmative defenses to defeat those claims.