In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code offers powerful protection for good-faith purchasers in bankruptcy sales because it limits appellate review of an approved sale, irrespective of the legal merits of the appeal. Specifically, it provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving the sale of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order. That is, section 363(m) renders an appeal "statutorily moot" absent a stay of the sale order.

The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees or individual creditors to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is well-established. However, until recently, Delaware bankruptcy courts have uniformly limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.

The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the equitable remedy of "substantive consolidation"—i.e., treating the assets and liabilities of two or more related entities as if they belonged to a single, consolidated bankruptcy estate. However, it is well recognized that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order such relief under appropriate circumstances in the exercise of its broad equitable powers when each of the original entities are already debtors subject to the court's jurisdiction.

To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.

Introduction

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to sell assets of the bankruptcy estate "free and clear" of "any interest in property" asserted by a non-debtor is an important tool designed to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois recently examined whether such interests include "successor liability" claims that might otherwise be asserted against the purchaser of a debtor's assets. In In re Norrenberns Foods, Inc., 642 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?

A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.

A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.