Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Le 27 juin 2024, la Cour suprême des États-Unis a publié une décision très attendue qu’elle a rendue dans l’affaire William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (l’« affaire Purdue »).
On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States released its highly anticipated decision in William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (Purdue). At issue was whether the U.S. bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to confirm a plan that provided for releases in favour of non-debtor parties, including parties providing a significant monetary contribution in support of the plan itself.
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.
Dans le contexte en constante évolution des lois canadiennes en matière d’insolvabilité, le regroupement de patrimoines se révèle comme un recours puissant. Bien qu’il soit rarement utilisé, il est susceptible d’entraîner des répercussions importantes pour les entités débitrices visées et leurs créanciers. C’est d’ailleurs ce que souligne une décision récente de la Cour d’appel du Manitoba, laquelle met en avant cet élément complexe, mais crucial, du droit de l’insolvabilité.
REGROUPEMENT DE PATRIMOINES
In the ever-changing landscape of Canadian insolvency law, substantive consolidation emerges as a powerful yet rare remedy with substantial implications for debtor entities and their creditors, as highlighted by a recent decision from the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which sheds light on a complex yet crucial aspect of insolvency law.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
Introduction
What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?
A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.