Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.
Background
Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):
After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)
Last week, in Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935 (May 26, 2015), the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court can enter final judgment on “non-core” claims under 28 U.S.C. § 157 if the parties consent to that court’s jurisdiction. It overturned a decision by the Seventh Circuit that relied heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Waldman v.
As we expected might happen in light of the Court’s previous order, the parties in the Detroit bankruptcy appeal agreed to postpone oral argument. In a letter to the parties, however, Judge Gibbons wrote that the appeals should be resolved before near the beginning of the hearing on the confirmation
Last Friday, the Sixth Circuit postponed oral argument in some of the pending cases in the appeal from the bankruptcy judge’s decision that Detroit was entitled to creditor protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and could try to alter the terms of workers’ pensions. The postponement was apparently granted to allow various pension groups to settle with the city.
In December, the Sixth Circuit, in Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. Still (In re McKenzie), 737 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir. 2013), addressed two matters of first impression when it adopted the majority rules that (i) a creditor who seeks relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay has the burden to prove the validity of its perfected security interest in collateral; and (ii) the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations on bankruptcy avoidance actions does not prevent the trustee from asserting them defensively under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.
A Michigan bankruptcy judge ruled yesterday that Detroit is eligible for protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, overruling numerous objections filed by labor unions, pension funds and other interested parties. Almost immediately following the ruling, a notice of appeal was filed by Counsel 25 of the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”).
In FDIC v. AmTrustFinancial Corporation, the Sixth Circuit considered the results of the very first trial in the nation under Bankruptcy Code Section 365(o). Section 365(o) is an infrequently litigated provision of the Bankruptcy Code that requires a party seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to fulfill “any commitment . . .