The term “golden shares” is often referred to equity interests held by a specific party—commonly a lender or investor—that authorize such party to block or prevent a corporate entity from filing bankruptcy. Such shares are often negotiated by a party that wants to ensure that its consent is obtained before any bankruptcy is commenced. Without such consent, the party holding the golden shares can seek to dismiss to a corporate bankruptcy filing by based on a lack of corporate authority.

The Bankruptcy Code often instructs a trustee or debtor to perform an act or make an election within a certain time. Sometimes the relevant provisions are intended to benefit a party in interest who is affected by a debtor’s or trustee’s action or election. Unfortunately, some of the provisions that prescribe a trustee or debtor to act fail to provide a remedy to the affected party in interest in the event the trustee or debtor does not act in compliance with the Code.

In In re Hungry Horse, LLC, Adversary Proceeding No. 16-11222 (Bankr. D. N.M. September 20, 2017) (“Hungry Horse”), the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court reminded us that many U.S. Supreme Court opinions can be limited in scope and do not necessarily dispose of all potential remedies to an issue.

In In re NewPage Corporation, et al., Adversary Proceeding No. 13-52429 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 13, 2017), a Delaware Bankruptcy Court applied a unique defense to certain preferential transfers targeted by a liquidating trustee. The defense focuses on a commonly overlooked element of a preferential transfer, section 547(b)(5).

Preference 101

State and federal laws provide numerous protections to secured parties to preserve their interests in collateral. As secured parties well know, however, these protections become more and more limited when the collateral is pledged to multiple secured parties. Issues, like priority of interests and liens, become more prevalent when the collateral at issue falls in value and multiple secured parties are fighting to enforce their interests in order to satisfy their debts.

State and federal laws provide numerous protections to secured parties to preserve their interests in collateral.  As secured parties well know, however, these protections become more and more limited when the collateral is pledged to multiple secured parties.  Issues, like priority of interests and liens, become more prevalent when the collateral at issue falls in value and multiple secured parties are fighting to enforce their interests in order to satisfy their debts.

In the recent case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA & others [2016] EWHC 1686, the High Court has held for the first time that a dividend can be challenged as a transaction entered into at an undervalue within the meaning of section 423(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA”).

The Facts

The facts of the case are long and complex but for present purposes the pertinent facts are as follows.

Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited (now Windward Prospects Limited) (“AWA”) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sequana SA (“SSA”).

Only a month ago we were singing the praises of the CVA and calling them the saviour of the high street following the creditors’ approval of the BHS CVA. (See our earlier blog Move over Mary Portas, CVA’s are the real saviour of the High Street).

The suitability of the collective consultation regime under the Trade Union and Labour Relation (Consolidation) Act 1992 (“TULRCA”) in an insolvency scenario has always been a hot topic amongst insolvency professionals.

As predicted at the Commercial Finance Association’s Fourth Annual Energy Summit on September 16th, we should start seeing more and more oil & gas companies struggle to survive in the wake of continued low commodity pricing.  While we witnessed some rebound in pricing towards the end of the summer, the price of oil again dipped to under $50 a barrel in September and the price of gas continues near historic lows, at just under $3.00 MMBtu.  As Philip Cook, the Chief Financ