On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
In a recent ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined whether circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear direct appeals of unauthorized bankruptcy court orders that have not been reviewed by a district court. This was an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court held that a bankruptcy court’s ruling in a non-core proceeding that has not been reviewed by the district court carries no adjudicative authority and is therefore not directly appealable to the circuit court.
The law on debt restructurings and liability management is back to where it was. Yesterday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the controversial District Court decisions in the Marblegate-Education Management bondholder litigation. The case attracted wide-spread attention in financial markets, and we discussed it in an earlier client alert.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Thomas Ambro, has reversed two district court opinions and refused to allow a company to use a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing as a means to reduce interest on its debt obligations. Specifically, the court held that filing for bankruptcy would not excuse a debtor from its obligation for a “make-whole” payment otherwise due to its lenders.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
On May 4, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a bankruptcy settlement in the form of a tender offer did not violate the principles of the bankruptcy process. See opinion here.
In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.
On March 1, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument on the seemingly simple question of what “actual fraud” means. The Court’s decision will have a significant impact on the reach of the exception to discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.