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It is commonly understood that, upon commencement of a bankruptcy case, section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code operates as an automatic statutory injunction against a wide variety of creditor actions and activities.

The High Court yesterday held that a Chairperson of a shareholder scheme meeting may reject votes cast against a scheme of arrangement in circumstances where the shares were acquired through an artificial share-splitting exercise designed to frustrate the scheme. It is the first English case to consider this issue and while it arose in the context of a shareholder scheme, the impact is also significant for debt restructurings implemented by way of a creditor scheme of arrangement.

Background

The concept of “equitable mootness” is a doctrine of relatively long-standing in bankruptcy jurisprudence. It has been used by courts to avoid determination of issues raised on appeal that would require the unscrambling of a plan previously confirmed and implemented. However, that doctrine has recently been questioned in a variety of decisions. It appears that the scope of equitable mootness is clearly ebbing. In that context, a recent decision by this Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provides an opportunity to further examine the doctrine.

On 22 November 2016, the European Commission published a draft directive on insolvency, restructuring and second chance. In this briefing we consider the proposals and what it means for European insolvency and for the UK.

On 22 November 2016, the European Commission published a draft directive on insolvency, restructuring and second chance (the Proposals).

What are the Proposals? The Proposals have three main parts:

“Reasonably equivalent value” – – part of the standard for evaluation of potential constructive fraudulent transfers – – is both subjective and imprecise. The words “equivalent value” require the court to make a subjective judgment whether consideration received in exchange for a transfer is worth the same as the consideration transferred by the debtor. And the considerations exchanged by the two parties are necessarily of differing characters. A transaction may involve the exchange of money for a tangible asset or for services.

Summary

Third parties associated with an employer may find themselves liable to contribute to the employer's occupational pension scheme. Where a pension scheme is in deficit, the Pensions Regulator has powers - so-called 'moral hazard' powers - that can require a third party to give financial support or a specific payment to the pension scheme.

The bankruptcy courts have a long history of being willing to use their judicial power under the Bankruptcy Code to prevent perceived efforts by debtors to inappropriately shield their assets from creditors. This is true even when the debtors employ structures and devices that are complex and crafted in seeming compliance with applicable law.

It is relatively rare when a Circuit Court issues an opinion on the preference defenses under section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is even more unusual when a decision examines the fact-focused “ordinary course” defense under section 547(c)(2). The ordinary course defense shields payments determined to have been made in the “ordinary course of business” of both the debtor and the creditor.