“Reasonably equivalent value” – – part of the standard for evaluation of potential constructive fraudulent transfers – – is both subjective and imprecise. The words “equivalent value” require the court to make a subjective judgment whether consideration received in exchange for a transfer is worth the same as the consideration transferred by the debtor. And the considerations exchanged by the two parties are necessarily of differing characters. A transaction may involve the exchange of money for a tangible asset or for services.

Last week, our post “You Can’t Always Get What You Want” discussed a Texas bankruptcy court decision rejecting efforts by debtor Sam Wyly to claim as exempt a number of offshore private annuities.

The High Court has reiterated that cross-examination will not generally be permitted on an interlocutory application, or where there is no conflict of fact on the affidavits.

In McCarthy v Murphy,^[1] the defendant mortgagor was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff (a receiver) or a bank employee who swore a supporting affidavit.

Background

The bankruptcy courts have a long history of being willing to use their judicial power under the Bankruptcy Code to prevent perceived efforts by debtors to inappropriately shield their assets from creditors. This is true even when the debtors employ structures and devices that are complex and crafted in seeming compliance with applicable law.

Two recent judgments have brought further clarity in relation to the rights acquirers of loan portfolios to enforce against borrowers:

In AIB Mortgage Bank -v- O'Toole & anor [2016] IEHC 368 the High Court determined that a bank was not prevented from relying on a mortgage as security for all sums due by the defendants, despite issuing a redemption statement which omitted this fact.

In order to understand this case, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events:

It is relatively rare when a Circuit Court issues an opinion on the preference defenses under section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is even more unusual when a decision examines the fact-focused “ordinary course” defense under section 547(c)(2). The ordinary course defense shields payments determined to have been made in the “ordinary course of business” of both the debtor and the creditor.

Delaware has long established itself as a welcoming jurisdiction for various legal purposes. It began as a center for company incorporation by providing a corporate law framework that was flexible and continuously updated for new developments. More recently, Delaware has applied those same principles (plus an expansive view of venue) to become a center for major chapter 11 reorganization filings.

The courts have long struggled with the question of whether particular orders entered by a bankruptcy court are final, and therefore appealable as a matter of right. It is generally recognized that a bankruptcy case is distinctly different from the usual civil case in that it is a framework within which a variety of disputes arise and are resolved. That distinction is recognized in 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(1), which provides that appeals as of right maybe taken not only from final judgments in cases but from “final judgments, orders, and decrees…in cases and proceedings….”

Bankruptcy law in Ireland is now, broadly speaking, in line with that of the United Kingdom.

In particular, for bankrupts who cooperate with the bankruptcy process:

• bankruptcy will end in one year; and
• their interest in their family home will re-vest in them after 3 years.

Notably however, the courts will have discretion to extend the period of bankruptcy for up to 15 years for non-cooperative individuals and those who have concealed or transferred assets to the detriment of creditors.