As noted in prior posts, the Ninth Circuit opened the door, albeit narrowly, to cannabis company bankruptcies when it issued its opinion in Garvin v. Cook Invs. NW on May 2, 2019. In Garvin, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the confirmation of a plan of reorganization proposed by the lessor to a marijuana growing operation.

It is well settled that the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition is to “give[] the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, (1934). A debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy, and the corresponding injunction provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, are the two primary elements that effectuate this financial fresh start.Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. Co. (In re Coho Res., Inc.), 345 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2003).

Earlier today, the Supreme Court finally answered the question of whether a trademark licensee is protected when the trademark owner/licensor files a bankruptcy petition and rejects the trademark license in accordance with section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. To cut to the chase, trademark licensees won.

Earlier today, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its long-awaited ruling in the Garvin v. Cook Investments, NW, SPNYW case This opinion is certain to be of great interest to both companies operating in the cannabis space and those attorneys representing them.

Last week, a Ninth Circuit panel held that plaintiffs in five related cases lacked standing to pursue their FCRA claims. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the allegation that a credit report contained misleading information, absent any indication that a consumer tried to engage in or was imminently planning to engage in any transactions for which the alleged misstatements in the credit reports made or would make any material difference, does not constitute a concrete injury.

What are the limits of a bankruptcy court’s authority to issue final orders and judgments? Does a bankruptcy court have authority under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to enter final orders in quintessential bankruptcy matters such as fraudulent transfer claims, or are the court’s powers more constrained? While the Supreme Court’s rulings in Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011), Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.

A U.S. Bankruptcy Court has denied a creditor’s motion for sanctions against a law firm in the Middle District of Florida which the creditor alleged engaged in serial filings.

A federal bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Florida has ruled that the owner of a computer-financing scheme cannot hide behind a bankruptcy filing to shield himself from complying with a contempt order that required him to pay $13.4 million for violating an FTC order.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan cannot modify the rights of a secured creditor whose claim is only secured by an “interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” On December 6, the Eleventh Circuit held that this provision prevents the discharge of a mortgage in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, regardless of whether the plan “provided for” the mortgage or whether the mortgagee filed a proof of claim.

In prior posts, we examined whether state-licensed marijuana businesses, and those doing business with marijuana businesses, can seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code. As we noted, the Office of the United States Trustee (the “UST”) has taken the position that a marijuana business cannot seek bankruptcy relief because the business itself violates the Controlled Substances Act 21, U.S.C.