On May 30, 2019, Dubai’s ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, signed DIFC Insolvency Law, Law No. 1 of 2019 (the “New Insolvency Law”) into law, thereby repealing and replacing DIFC Law No. 3 of 2009. The New Insolvency Law, and supporting regulations (the “Regulations”), became effective on June 13, 2019, and govern companies operating in the Dubai International Financial Centre (the “DIFC”).

As noted in prior posts, the Ninth Circuit opened the door, albeit narrowly, to cannabis company bankruptcies when it issued its opinion in Garvin v. Cook Invs. NW on May 2, 2019. In Garvin, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the confirmation of a plan of reorganization proposed by the lessor to a marijuana growing operation.

In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. ___ (2019), the Supreme Court held that a debtor’s rejection of a trademark license does not eliminate the licensee’s right to use the trademark through the completion of the contract, settling a split in the Circuits. The Supreme Court also ruled that the case was not moot, despite the bankruptcy estate’s distribution of all of its assets, which may have important implications for the developing jurisprudence on mootness in bankruptcy cases.

Earlier today, the Supreme Court finally answered the question of whether a trademark licensee is protected when the trademark owner/licensor files a bankruptcy petition and rejects the trademark license in accordance with section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. To cut to the chase, trademark licensees won.

Earlier today, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its long-awaited ruling in the Garvin v. Cook Investments, NW, SPNYW case This opinion is certain to be of great interest to both companies operating in the cannabis space and those attorneys representing them.

What are the limits of a bankruptcy court’s authority to issue final orders and judgments? Does a bankruptcy court have authority under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to enter final orders in quintessential bankruptcy matters such as fraudulent transfer claims, or are the court’s powers more constrained? While the Supreme Court’s rulings in Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011), Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.

In In re 1141 Realty Owner LLC, et al., No. 18-12341 (SMB), 2019 WL 1270818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2019), Bankruptcy Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York recently reaffirmed that upon sufficient contractual language, "make whole" prepayment premiums are enforceable under New York law even after loan acceleration. The court emphasized that the language of the contract provided for such a result and that this was an enforceable liquidated damages clause under New York law.

In a unanimous 25 February panel decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trustee liquidating Bernard L. Madoff’s investment firm can claw back billions in Ponzi scheme proceeds from investors who received the proceeds indirectly through non-U.S. “feeder funds” (funds that aggregate investor capital to invest in funds such as Madoff’s).

In a recent decision, EMA GARP Fund v. Banro Corporation, No. 18 CIV. 1986 (KPF), 2019 WL 773988 (S.D.N.Y. 21 February 2019), District Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York enforced a foreign reorganization plan in the United States on the basis of international comity, notwithstanding that no application for recognition and enforcement had been made under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Banro Corp.

In a unanimous 25 February panel decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trustee liquidating Bernard L. Madoff's investment firm can claw back billions in Ponzi scheme proceeds from investors who received the proceeds indirectly through non-U.S. "feeder funds" (funds that aggregate investor capital to invest in funds such as Madoff's).