The NSW Supreme Court has given a Landlord leave to commence proceedings against a company for rent and make good costs arising after the date of the DOCA.
BACKGROUND
This week’s TGIF examines a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales which considered whether payments made by a third party to a company’s creditors could be recovered as unfair preferences.
What happened?
On 2 September 2015, liquidators were appointed to a building and construction company (the Company) and later commenced proceedings against eight defendants for the recovery of payments considered to be unfair preferences.
Late last month, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin & Howard Shareff. At issue in PEM Entities is whether a debt claim held by existing equity investors should be recharacterized as equity. The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve a split among the federal circuits concerning whether federal or state law should govern debt recharacterization claims.
We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.
What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.
This week’s TGIF considers a NSW Court of Appeal decision which confirms that liquidators who bring a claim for preference payments within the limitation period may amend that claim to capture additional transactions otherwise subject to a statutory bar.
Background
Sydney Recycling Park (SRP) provided “tipping services” to Cardinal Group (Cardinal), who were in the business of “waste management”. Cardinal ran into some financial difficulties and on 1 February 2012, it was placed into liquidation.
In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.
This week’s TGIF considers the recent decision of Hastie Group Ltd (in liq) v Moore [2016] NSWCA 305 in which the Court held that privilege attached to an expert report prepared for the purpose of obtaining litigation funding.
WHAT HAPPENED?
What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.
When should debt be recharacterized as equity? The answer to this question will have an enormous impact upon expected recovery in bankruptcy since equity does not begin to get paid until all prior classes of claims are paid in full. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided some guidance on when and in what circumstances recharacterization is appropriate. The Court’s decision also serves as warning to purchasers of debt that they may not be able to hide behind the original debt transaction in a recharacterization fight.