What is the GDPR?

Last Friday, October 13, Judge Sean H. Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion addressing the presumption against extraterritoriality of US law as well as the limits of the doctrine of international comity.

For decades, restructuring and insolvency matters in the Dominican Republic involving merchants and companies in non-regulated industries have been carried out on a “de facto” basis, due to the obsolescence of the existing legal framework and institutions. Fortunately, that is not the case anymore.

Late last month, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin & Howard Shareff. At issue in PEM Entities is whether a debt claim held by existing equity investors should be recharacterized as equity. The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve a split among the federal circuits concerning whether federal or state law should govern debt recharacterization claims.

We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.

On 6 April 2017, the new Insolvency Rules come into force which will affect creditors’

rights in most insolvency procedures. The changes are designed to ensure insolvency processes are as efficient and streamlined as possible in order to maximise returns to creditors by reducing costs whilst retaining safeguards to avoid abuse or injustice.

Whether you are faced with an insolvent customer, client, supplier, tenant or other debtor, you will need to know about the key changes to the rules. This article highlights the important changes affecting your rights as a creditor.

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.

The recent successful appeal in Brooks and another (Joint Liquidators of Robin Hood Centre plc in liquidation) v Armstrong and another [2016] EWHC 2893 (Ch), [2016] All ER (D) 117 (Nov) has clarified and highlighted the complexities of bringing a wrongful trading claim and the importance of correctly quantifying losses for which directors can be made personally liable under section 214 and/or 246Z of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“the Act”).

What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.