Late last month, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin & Howard Shareff. At issue in PEM Entities is whether a debt claim held by existing equity investors should be recharacterized as equity. The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve a split among the federal circuits concerning whether federal or state law should govern debt recharacterization claims.

We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.

In Nortel Network’s (“Nortel”) chapter 11 case, In re: Nortel Networks Inc., et al., United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 09-10138(KG), Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross recently reduced the Indenture Trustee’s counsel fees by $913,936.00 in response to heavily litigated objections to the fees by noteholders, Solus Alternative Asset Management LP (“Solus”) and PointState Capital LP (“PointState”) (collectively the “Objecting Noteholders”).

This week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its highly-anticipated ruling in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp. (“Marblegate”). At issue in Marblegate was whether Education Management Corp. (“EDMC”) violated the Trust Indenture Act when it implemented a restructuring that impaired the rights of Marblegate Asset Management, LLC (“MAM”). The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision in favor of MAM, and held that EDMC’s restructuring did not violate the TIA.

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.

Recently, in Caesars Entertainment Operating Co. (“Caesars”), U.S. Bankruptcy Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar denied payment of indenture trustee Wilmington Trust’s attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the Debtors’ motion to approve a settlement. The U.S. Trustee objected to payment arguing that the Debtor could not rely on 11 U.S.C. § 363 (seeking settlement approval) as authority to pay Wilmington Trust’s fees and costs. Sustaining the U.S.

What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.

When should debt be recharacterized as equity? The answer to this question will have an enormous impact upon expected recovery in bankruptcy since equity does not begin to get paid until all prior classes of claims are paid in full. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided some guidance on when and in what circumstances recharacterization is appropriate. The Court’s decision also serves as warning to purchasers of debt that they may not be able to hide behind the original debt transaction in a recharacterization fight.

The Jevic Holding Corp. bankruptcy case is proving to be precedent setting.  In a prior post, we examined how the court had greatly increased the evidentiary burden on a party seeking to hold one company liable for the debts of another company under a “single employer” theory.  That ruling was seen as a boon for private equity firms who were oftentimes the target of Chapter 11 creditor