Certain licensees of intellectual property are expressly given expanded rights when their licensors file bankruptcy. But what about trademark licensees? Trademarks are not among the defined categories of “intellectual property” for bankruptcy purposes. Nonetheless, are trademark licensees otherwise protected in a licensor bankruptcy? Unfortunately for these licensees, a recent circuit court decision put the brakes on attempts to expand protection to licensees of trademarks.
In a prior post, we examined whether state-licensed marijuana businesses, and those doing business with marijuana businesses, can seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
As more and more states pass laws allowing the sale of marijuana, whether for medicinal or recreational purposes, investors will try to claim their share of what is certainly going to be a lucrative market. However, even in a growing market, private enterprises fail or need restructuring. This raises the question of whether distressed marijuana businesses, and those doing business with marijuana businesses, can seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
Last Friday, October 13, Judge Sean H. Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion addressing the presumption against extraterritoriality of US law as well as the limits of the doctrine of international comity.
For decades, restructuring and insolvency matters in the Dominican Republic involving merchants and companies in non-regulated industries have been carried out on a “de facto” basis, due to the obsolescence of the existing legal framework and institutions. Fortunately, that is not the case anymore.
Late last month, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin & Howard Shareff. At issue in PEM Entities is whether a debt claim held by existing equity investors should be recharacterized as equity. The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve a split among the federal circuits concerning whether federal or state law should govern debt recharacterization claims.
We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.
Sedert 1 januari 2017 voorziet de wet uitdrukkelijk in een algemene mogelijkheid voor de Rijksdienst voor Sociale Zekerheid (“RSZ”) om onbetwiste geldschulden in te vorderen door middel van een dwangbevel.
Dit houdt in dat de RSZ zichzelf een uitvoerbare titel (een dwangbevel) kan verschaffen, zonder een omweg te maken via de arbeidsrechtbank.
De invordering via dwangbevel is mogelijk voor alle bijdragen, bijdrageopslagen, verwijlintresten en andere vergoedingen die aan de RSZ verschuldigd zouden zijn. Belangrijk is weliswaar dat het dient te gaan om schulden:
Since 1 January 2017, the law explicitly provides for a general option for the National Social Security Office (“NSSO”) to recover undisputed debts by means of a writ of execution.
This means that the NSSO can provide itself an enforceable title (a writ of execution) without having to rely on the labor court.
The recovery through a writ of execution can be used for all contributions, penalties, interests and other amounts that would be due to the NSSO. It is, however, important that it concerns debts:
(i) that are not fundamentally disputed;
What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.