On 23 March 2017, Justice Robson of the Supreme Court of Victoria declined to follow the Victorian Court of Appeal decision of Re Enhill, finding that the decision was not binding with respect to different legislation (the Companies Act 1961 (Vic) as opposed to theCorporations Act 2001 (Cth)).

Background

Since the early 1980s, there has been a divergence of judicial opinion in the decisions of Re EnhillPty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 561 and Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liq) (1983) 33 SASR 99.

On 17 March, in Hambleton v Finn [2017] QDC 61, McGill SC DCJ of the District Court of Queensland applied the section 553C(1) setoff under the Corporations Act 2001 to a liquidator’s insolvent trading claim against a director.

His Honour followed the earlier decision of the District Court of Queensland in Morton v Rexel Electrical Supplies Pty Ltd. In that case, the set-off provision was applied where the liquidator was seeking the recovery of unfair preference payments.

When a lessee fails to comply with a notice to remedy a non-payment or other lease default, the lessor may be entitled to terminate the lease and retake possession of the property. This is commonly done by changing the locks.

However, a lessee who wants to save itself from being evicted can apply to court to prevent the lessor from retaking possession. In Queensland this application is made under section 124 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and is known as an application for relief against forfeiture.

When is relief against forfeiture granted?

Last week the Supreme Court of New South Wales provided another timely reminder to ensure that all security interests are correctly registered on the Personal Property and Securities Register (PPSR) through the decision In the matter of OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2017] NSWSC 21.

The facts

Alleasing Pty Ltd leased a crushing and screening plant (for approximately $4 million annually in rent) and spare parts for the crusher to OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Limited.

Failing to register a lessor’s security interest on the PPSR over plant and equipment at leased premises can result in the lessor’s unperfected security interest passing to the administrator of the lessee.

In the recent decision of Flown Pty Ltd v Goldrange Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 419, a lessee’s administrator successfully retained ownership of plant and equipment (which were not fixtures) in the leased premises.

Background

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

In the recent case of Hadley v BetHQ Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1263, the debtor company, BetHQ, came to grief when a statutory demand was validly served at the company’s registered office in Brisbane as shown in ASIC records. The premises were a serviced office; however BetHQ had ceased operations at the serviced office and had moved its operations to Victoria.

When a secured creditor appoints a receiver it is usual for them to sign an agreement setting out the terms of the receiver’s appointment, including payment of the receiver’s remuneration, costs and expenses. Appointment documents commonly contain indemnity clauses in which the secured creditor agrees to indemnify the receiver in specified circumstances.

In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.

What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.