Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.
Online claims-trading platform Xclaim Inc. came under scrutiny this past summer in the Madison Square Boys & Girls Club Inc. bankruptcy case pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Since at least 2019, Xclaim has executed agreements with at least five notice and claims agent firms to synchronize their proofs of claim registers with Xclaim’s website where such claims are posted for sale.
A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.
In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.
Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.
What options does a creditor have when they are frustrated with how a debtor is conducting its chapter 11 bankruptcy case? In In re PWM Property Management LLC, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion by creditors and interest holders to file a proposed plan of reorganization as an exhibit to their opposition to the debtors’ motion to extend the exclusivity period. The PWM Property Management decision serves as an important reminder of the strict limits on who can file and solicit a plan of reorganization and when filing of a plan is appropriate.
This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.
Can messy be good? Sometimes the answer is yes. The chapter 11 case filed by Limetree Bay Services, LLC and five of its affiliates (“Limetree Bay”) is one example of auction disorder actually bringing increased creditor recoveries. Bankruptcy professionals, financially distressed companies and acquirers of distressed assets can learn valuable lessons from this odd bankruptcy auction process, which shows the importance of (1) debtors preserving their flexibility during an auction, and (2) investors having appropriate expectations and resources before bidding on a debtor’s assets.
Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of a structured dismissal in 2017,[1] there is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Here we go again – proposed bankruptcy venue legislation is back after previous “reform” efforts came up empty. For those seeking legislative action, what are the chances for venue reform now?