Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the application of the provision, including application to financial institutions, its preemptive scope, and its application to non-publicly traded securities.

A bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid and recover pre-bankruptcy preferential transfers is essential to preserving or augmenting the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. In 2019, however, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to add a due diligence requirement to the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance provision, apparently as a way to minimize the volume of speculative and coercive preference litigation.

A floating charge debenture holder has the advantage that they can enforce their security by appointing their choice of administrators. This is a powerful and useful tool for lenders but is subject to the caveat that the debenture has to be “qualifying”.

As far as they go, restructuring plans have worked well since they were first introduced 3 years ago. This is reflected in the most recent review of CIGA published by the Insolvency Service which reflects favourably on this new insolvency measure. However, there are still some barriers to its use.

The three year review of CIGA (the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act) published by the Insolvency Service suggests that we might see changes to the corporate moratorium process – will these address concerns about the process and encourage more insolvency practitioners to recommend its use?

It’s now level pegging for HMRC on cram down – twice it has been crammed down, and twice it has not.

In the most recent restructuring plan proposed by Prezzo, the court sanctioned the company’s restructuring plan and crammed down HMRC as both preferential and unsecured creditor. Unlike Houst’s restructuring plan, where HMRC was also crammed down, HMRC fiercely contested the plan proposed by Prezzo.

Snapshot

The Restructuring Plan (Plan) was introduced as part of the UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, which introduced a new part 26A into the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). The part 26A Plan provisions are largely based on the existing scheme of arrangement rules detailed under part 26 of the CA 2006, and it is often referred to as the “super scheme”.

Plans now sit alongside schemes of arrangement and company voluntary arrangements (CVAs) to provide a further restructuring option for companies and insolvency practitioners alike.

To prevent landlords under long-term real property leases from reaping a windfall for future rent claims at the expense of other creditors, the Bankruptcy Code caps the amount of a landlord's claim against a debtor-tenant for damages "resulting from the termination" of a real property lease.

What can we say about the outcome of the GAS (Great Annual Savings Company Limited) sanction hearing that hasn’t already been reported?

It’s impossible not to comment on the fact that the plan was not sanctioned, and as a consequence of fierce opposition from HMRC that it avoided cram down. Nor that the court refused to sanction the plan on the basis that the conditions for cram down were not met – the court was not satisfied that HMRC would be better off under the plan and even if it were the judge said he would have not exercised his discretion to cram down.

‘If, at first, you don’t succeed, then try and try again’ is a fitting description for HMRC’s recent approach to restructuring plans, with its opposition of plans proposed by The Great Annual Savings Company (GAS) and Nasmyth Group Limited (Naysmyth).

The GAS sanction hearing (which is due to take place this week) will be the first time that HMRC has taken an active role contesting a restructuring plan at sanction following the case of Houst where the Court exercised its discretionary power to “cram down” HMRC.