Restructuring Plans (RPs)
2024 was a year of firsts for RPs, and as case law in this area continues to evolve, there is little doubt that this will carry through into 2025.
It would be remiss not to expect to see more RPs in 2025. News of Thames Water's restructuring is "splashed" all over the press and Speciality Steel's plan might see the first "cram up" of creditors, but there seems a long way to go to get creditors onside.
The below sets out key considerations when dealing with an extension of an administration at the end of the first-year anniversary.
Categorisation of a charge as fixed or floating will have a significant impact on how assets are dealt with on insolvency and creditor outcomes.
Typical fixed charge assets include land, property, shares, plant and machinery, intellectual property such as copyrights, patents and trademarks and goodwill.
Typical floating charge assets include stock and inventory, trade debtors, cash and currency, movable plant and machinery (such as vehicles), and raw materials and other consumable items used by the business.
As practitioners we pour over notices of intention to appoint (NOIA) and notices of appointment of administrators (NOA) to make sure every detail is accurate. Why? Because no one wants to risk an invalid appointment because there was a minor mistake or error that was overlooked. Understandably errors occur, particularly when the appointment of administrators often happens at speed, with all parties inevitably juggling many balls. Prescribed information may have been missed, or incorrectly stated and procedural steps may have been inadvertently forgotten.
For those that are that way inclined (which includes us at #SPBRestructuring!), the 500 plus page Wright v Chappell judgment which sets out the BHS wrongful trading claim against its former directors makes for an interesting read. It paints a colourful picture of the downfall of the BHS group, from the point that it was sold for £1 to its eventual demise into administration and then liquidation. You can make your own mind up about the characters involved, but the story is a sorry one, with creditors ultimately suffering the most.
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.
No, it isn’t. We now have two cases where the Court has confirmed that insolvency practitioners do not need the consent of paid secured creditors when extending an administration under para. 78 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”).
Today, in Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, the Supreme Court held that debtors who paid fees in bankruptcy cases administered by the U.S. Trustee Program are not entitled to any relief, even though the Court previously ruled that those debtors had been unconstitutionally overcharged. This decision is the culmination of several years of litigation concerning differential fee structures across judicial districts.
This question was considered in the recent case of Pindar where the judge concluded that an administration had been validly extended where the consent of one of the secured creditors (who had been paid) was not obtained.
This morning, the Supreme Court decided Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., which clarifies that any party with a "direct financial stake in the outcome" of a reorganization has standing as a "party in interest" to object to a Chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C. 1109(b). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor held that the debtor's insurer has standing to object even if the plan purports to preserve the insurer's legal rights and thus is said to be "insurance neutral."