Background

The partly liberalized Indian economy has been aptly referred to in the Economic Survey of India 2015-16 as one that had transitioned from ‘socialism with limited entry to “marketism” without exit.

Given the vexed ‘twin balance sheet’ problem chafing both banks and corporates in India, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC/Code) was a critical structural reform. Many issues have surfaced since the Code was operationalised and the courts and the Central Government have stepped in to iron out such issues in the last one year.

Pre-financial crisis, interest rate derivatives were widely recognized as a valuable part of the municipal issuer’s financial toolkit. Post-crisis, they have been a thorn in the side of many issuers, resulting in expensive litigation with failed swap providers – most notably the Lehman and Ambac derivatives trading subsidiaries – and public criticism of municipal issuers said to have fallen prey to more sophisticated providers.

Structured finance transaction documents have typically included subordination provisions in their post-default waterfalls, effectively changing a swap counterparty’s right to get paid from above that of the noteholders to below that of the noteholders.

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (“ISDA”) is preparing forms of amendment to its boilerplate master agreements in connection with market practice relating to the suspension of payments by a non-defaulting party. ISDA is also considering a protocol to implement the amendments into existing agreements on a multilateral basis.  

On May 5, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declaring that a party’s right to setoff in an ISDA Master Agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy unless strict mutuality exists. (Decision and Order).