As outlined in our client publication of March 27, 2020 (Update for Borrowers and Lenders in Germany), by a new law effective since March 27, 2020 (the “German Covid-19 Insolvency Law Amendment”), the obligation of the management of a legal person pursuant to section 15a of the German Insolvency Act (“German InsO”) has been suspended until September 30, 2020 if certain conditions are met.
In light of the growing pandemic of COVID-19 the German government has decided on a number of unprecedented restrictions for all areas of private and business life which were unimaginable just a few weeks ago. As a result, many production facilities and businesses had to shut down. While the consequences for many companies are already dramatic, the full impact on the economy is still unpredictable as it is unclear how long the current restrictions will subsist.
Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In a blow to the Lehman Chapter 11 estates, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on September 16, 2015 that Intel Corporation’s Loss calculation resulting from a failed transaction under an ISDA Master Agreement was appropriate.1 The decision is significant both because of the dearth of judicial interpretation of the ISDA mechanics regarding the calculation of early termination amounts, and because it affirms the general market understanding that a non-defaulting party has broad discretion in calculating “Loss,” so long as its