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In Topfer v. Topfer (In re Topfer), Case No. 5-18-ap-00066 RNO (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2018), the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania remanded a three-and half year old divorce proceeding that had been removed to bankruptcy court. But, the remand became more complicated than it needed to be.

The chapter 7 debtor had removed the divorce action immediately after filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy. Shortly after removal, the non-debtor spouse moved to remand the case on mandatory abstention and permissive abstention grounds.

Banks regularly enter into commercial relationships with their customers such as opening new depository accounts.  These relationships are often contractual in nature and seem relatively straightforward until an unexpected incident occurs that causes the relationship to unravel. What then are the duties owed by each party to each another?  The default rule seems to be that the terms and conditions that the parties agreed to at first govern the parties’ actions throughout their banking relationship.

The term “golden shares” is often referred to equity interests held by a specific party—commonly a lender or investor—that authorize such party to block or prevent a corporate entity from filing bankruptcy. Such shares are often negotiated by a party that wants to ensure that its consent is obtained before any bankruptcy is commenced. Without such consent, the party holding the golden shares can seek to dismiss to a corporate bankruptcy filing by based on a lack of corporate authority.

The Bankruptcy Code often instructs a trustee or debtor to perform an act or make an election within a certain time. Sometimes the relevant provisions are intended to benefit a party in interest who is affected by a debtor’s or trustee’s action or election. Unfortunately, some of the provisions that prescribe a trustee or debtor to act fail to provide a remedy to the affected party in interest in the event the trustee or debtor does not act in compliance with the Code.

Background

In our previous publication on the subject, we had discussed the changes introduced by the Ordinance dated 23 November 2017 (the Ordinance), amending the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) (see our Ergo Newsflash dated 24 November 2017).

Background

The partly liberalized Indian economy has been aptly referred to in the Economic Survey of India 2015-16 as one that had transitioned from ‘socialism with limited entry to “marketism” without exit.

Given the vexed ‘twin balance sheet’ problem chafing both banks and corporates in India, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC/Code) was a critical structural reform. Many issues have surfaced since the Code was operationalised and the courts and the Central Government have stepped in to iron out such issues in the last one year.

In In re Hungry Horse, LLC, Adversary Proceeding No. 16-11222 (Bankr. D. N.M. September 20, 2017) (“Hungry Horse”), the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court reminded us that many U.S. Supreme Court opinions can be limited in scope and do not necessarily dispose of all potential remedies to an issue.

In its first detailed ruling on some of the substantive legal questions under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code), the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Apex Court) has delivered a landmark order in the matter of Innoventive Industries Ltd v ICICI Bank and Another with an expressly avowed objective of ensuring that all the courts and tribunals across the country take notice of a ‘paradigm shift in the law’ ushered in by the Code.

Brief Background