Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

The recent Supreme Court of New South Wales decision of Fitz Jersey Pty Ltd v Atlas Construction Group Pty Ltd (in liq)¹ clarifies that s 588FF of the Corporations Act permits an assignee of a liquidator’s voidable transaction claim to trace a company’s property or proceeds for the purposes of the assignee’s recovery proceedings.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

This was first published in the LexisNexis Insolvency Law Bulletin (Vol. 21, No. 5 & 6).

This article is co-authored by Justin Ward of Litigation Capital Management and Marcel Fernandes of 12 Wentworth Selborne Chambers.

Background

The plaintiff was the primary trading entity within a larger group of companies which operated a development and construction business.

The liquidation of the group was complex, with a significant number of claims identified as requiring investigation. Further, ASIC’s allegations of serious misconduct resulted in a significant amount of the liquidator’s time being allocated to assisting ASIC with its investigation.

Problem

This article was originally published in the Australian Restructuring, Insolvency & Turnaround Association Journal (Volume 32 #01 2020)

The first of March marked the second anniversary of the changes to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) permitting an external administrator to assign rights to sue. The Australian Government proposed the reform in the hope that the ‘sale of rights of action may enable the value in such rights to be realised’[1].

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?