Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

A degree of certainty—for the time being—has been restored for participants in the commercial lending and debt trading markets who have been tracking the appeal of a controversial 2009 fraudulent transfer decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy case.i On February 11, 2011, Judge Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida quashed (or nullified)ii the bankruptcy court’s decision, which ordered a group of lenders to disgorge $480 million received in connection with loans they extended to a joint venture involving TOUSA, Inc.

A recent decision in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, In re Tousa,[1] has received widespread attention for its near wholesale rejection of insolvency “savings clauses,” and the resulting order requiring lenders to disgorge hundreds of millions of dollars. The decision raises numerous practical problems for participants in the secondary loan and derivatives markets, and more generally for commercial lenders and borrowers.

Background