The Issue
The issue is whether a Chapter 11 plan can be crammed down over the secured lender’s objection where the plan provides for the sale or transfer of the secured lender’s collateral with the proceeds going to the secured lender without the secured lender having the right to credit bid for is collateral up to the full amount of its claim.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and Commodities Futures Trading Commission often seek appointment of receivers in civil enforcement actions, including in actions alleging operation of Ponzi-like investment schemes. Receivers are generally tasked with taking over entities used to perpetrate schemes, conducting forensic accountings, reporting their findings to the appointing court, and recovering funds, where possible, for distribution to defrauded investors.
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the “deepening insolvency” cause of action, which the Third Circuit previously recognized in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001), remains an independent cause of action under Pennsylvania law.
Background
In an opinion that has wide-ranging implications for the structured finance industry, the Delaware bankruptcy court recently dismissed a mezzanine borrower’s chapter 11 case as a bad faith filing pursuant to section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II, LLC, No. 11-13338, 2011 WL 6749058 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec.
On December 29, 2011, the FDIC filed suit against seven former directors of the Bank of Asheville in the Western District of North Carolina seeking to recover over $6.8 million in losses suffered by the bank prior to receivership. All of the directors named as defendants were members of the bank’s Loan Committee, the committee responsible “for the amplification, implementation and administration of the loan policy” and “management of the lending function”. The Complaint cites 30 specific commercial real estate and business loans approved by the defendants between June 26, 2007 a
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of a single asset real estate case on Jan. 19, 2012, reasoning that the debtor’s proposed substitute collateral “was not the indubitable equivalent of the [undersecured lender’s] mortgage.”In re River East Plaza, LLC, 2012 WL 169760, *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012) (Posner, J.). In the court’s words, the debtor “wanted [the lender] out of there and decided to seek confirmation of a [reorganization] plan . . .
On December 22, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware inIn re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II LLC 1 dismissed with prejudice a mezzanine borrower’s bankruptcy case for bad faith under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the court clarified that the standard in the Third Circuit to evaluate the good faith of a debtor seeking shelter under the umbrella of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is an objective one and does not consider the subjective good faith of a debtor as do courts within the Secon d Circuit.
On January 4, 2012, Madoff trustee Irving Picard filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
While bankruptcy law and tort law may not seem related, it is important to know if your client has ever gone through a bankruptcy and, if so, the terms of its plan of reorganization. A recent Eighth Circuit decision confirmed the importance of knowing the ins and outs of a client’s bankruptcy and the terms of the applicable plan.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held recently that § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code does not limit the potential recovery on fraudulent transfer claims to the amount of unpaid creditor claims against a debtor’s estate. According to the Court, the language in § 550(a) that states that a plaintiff in an avoidance action can recover the property transferred or the value of the property “for the benefit of the estate” provides a “floor” rather than a “ceiling” on recovery.