In Notice 2012-39 (the “Notice”), the IRS issued guidance announcing its intention to issue regulations with respect to certain transfers of intangible property by a U.S. corporation to a foreign corporation in a reorganization described in section 361 of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), citing significant policy concerns involving certain intellectual property transfers that permit U.S. persons to repatriate earnings without U.S. income taxation. The IRS’ position in the Notice will impact repatriation planning strategies.
Background
In a recent decision, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with a situation that is the bane of any commercial and business attorney. A legal document contained an error. But in this case, the error was so extreme and obvious that the court was willing to reform the document to correct the error, in the face of other cases where courts refused to let parties escape from their mistakes. In re: Equipment Acquisition Resources (7th Cir., No. 1103905 decided on August 9, 2012)
There are generally three types of claims in a bankruptcy proceeding: unsecured claims, secured claims and administrative expense claims. Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the allowance of administrative expense claims. Section 503 provides that "after notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses…, including the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
In Re Loucheschi LLC, 471 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D. Mass 2012) –
When a lender makes a loan that does not comply with usury laws it runs a risk that not only will interest and charges be disallowed, but also the entire loan may be declared void. In cases where declaring a usurious loan void is discretionary, one might expect a bankruptcy court to be inclined to do so since it could benefit the bankruptcy estate.
On August 2, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc. (In re MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc.), Case No. 11-30553 (5th Cir. 2012), holding that a real estate management company’s electricity supply contract qualified as a “forward contract”, payments on account of which are protected from avoidance as preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions.
In the Summer 2009 issue of the Legal Canvas, we wrote about the wisdom of filing a UCC financing statement when art work is consigned to a gallery. Specifically, we said that the filing of a financing statement that reflects the consignor’s interest in the work provides protection against the gallery’s creditors. Financing statements take no time to prepare and cost less than $50 to file.
It could be money well spent.
A Georgia bankruptcy court has held that notwithstanding the discharge of an individual in his individual bankruptcy proceeding, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) may file suit against the individual as a former officer of a failed bank so long as the applicable D&O policy covers defense costs and the FDIC’s recovery is limited to insurance proceeds. In re Hayden, 2012 WL 3597422 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. July 6, 2012).
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 363(f), a bankruptcy judge may authorize the sale of a debtor’s assets free and clear of liens, claims, and interests. This is meant to allow a buyer to acquire assets without the risk of future claims being asserted with respect to the purchased assets and to maximize the value of a debtors assets, thereby maximizing creditors' recovery.
In a recent decision authored by Chief Judge Easterbrook, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, Docket No. 11-3920 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012)) held that the licensee of a trademark does not necessarily lose the right to use the licensed marks when a debtor-licensor rejects the underlying license agreement in its bankruptcy case. In so holding, the Court rejected a contrary decision reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.