(6th Cir. B.A.P. June 1, 2016)

The Sixth Circuit B.A.P. reverses the bankruptcy court’s sua sponte granting of summary judgment in favor of the trustee. The trustee brought the action to avoid the appellants’  liens in the debtor’s aircraft. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment because its decision was not based on undisputed facts. Instead, the bankruptcy court based its decision on assumptions derived from the appellants’ inability to produce sufficient documentation. Opinion below.

Judge: Harrison

In a 10-page decision dated June 6, 2016, Judge Carey of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court denied a motion to dismiss filed by a holder of a “Golden Share” of Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC (the “Debtor”). Judge Carey’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”). A “Golden Share” is “A type of share that gives its shareholder veto power over changes to the company’s charter.

On June 5th and 6th, 2016, Houston-based energy firm Hercules Offshore Inc. and its affiliated debtors (“Hercules” or “Debtors”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

Learning the interplay between state rules of judicial procedure and federal bankruptcy law can be a daunting undertaking, but the pitfalls of failing to do so can be severe. A recent example of the importance of being mindful of these issues is Hewett v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee, No. 2D15–1074, 2016 WL 3065014 (Fla. 2d DCA June 1, 2016) where the filing of a bankruptcy petition ultimately cost a foreclosure defendant his right to appeal a final judgment of foreclosure.

The Second DCA summarized the procedural posture of the case as follows:

A recent case out of the Southern District of New York, Citibank, NA, London Branch v. Norske Skogindustrier ASA(S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2016), once again illustrates the difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief against prospective indenture violations of a financially troubled issuer.

The Facts

With the current interest being focused on Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, this may be a good time to examine the differing rights of noteholders under an indenture governed by the TIA and the rights of lenders under credit agreements governed by New York law.

One of the more appealing aspects of the U.S. bankruptcy process is the relative ease in which parties in interest may file proofs of claim. In years passed all it took was to mail in a simple form to the bankruptcy court or claims agent and now it is even easier with the advent of email and electronic claims uploading. This relatively easy process, however, often comes with a plethora of invalid or unenforceable proofs of claim.

A contractual waiver of an entity’s right to file for bankruptcy is generally invalid as a matter of public policy. Nonetheless, lenders sometimes attempt to prevent a borrower from seeking bankruptcy protection by conditioning financing on a covenant, bylaw, or corporate charter provision that restricts the power of the borrower’s governing body to authorize such a filing. One such restriction—a lender-designated “special member” with the power to block a bankruptcy filing—was recently invalidated by the court in In re Lake Mich.

Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).

Even before Congress added section 365(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it was generally understood that a nonresidential real property lease which has been validly terminated under applicable law prior to a bankruptcy filing by the debtor-former tenant cannot be assumed or assigned in bankruptcy. Moreover, the terminated leasehold interest is excluded from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and any action by the landlord to obtain possession of the formerly leased premises is not prohibited by the automatic stay.