Claims disputes are “core proceedings” in bankruptcy cases that are subject to the general jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, subject to exceptions for personal injury tort or wrongful death claims. Under 28 U.S.C.
In a case of first impression, DLA Piper argued before the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that a consent provision in a Delaware LLC operating agreement effectively granting a creditor a veto right over a debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy was void because it was contrary to federal public policy.
Who doesn’t love a good catch-all provision? In a world of infinite possibilities, attorneys often find themselves drafting language designed to encompass a plethora of contingencies. Are such efforts sometimes overkill? Perhaps. Nevertheless, given our imperfect ability to predict the future, such provisions are often necessary and appropriate.
The Eleventh Circuit has made it clear: it will not back down from its decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, a decision it issued in 2014 and one which has been the subject of hot debate ever since. In Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt and the filing of a proof of claim on time-barred debt violated the FDCPA. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). Since Crawford, the debate has raged on with several courts weighing in on the subject.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve") recently issued a proposed rule (the "Proposed Rule") that would significantly limit derivative counterparty remedies upon the insolvency of US global systematically important banking organizations ("GSIB") and their affiliates and the US operations of foreign GSIBs (collectively, "Covered Entities").
Yet another company in the energy sector has filed for bankruptcy protection. On June 17, 2016, Maxus Energy Corporation, and its affiliates (“Debtors”) filed for chapter 11 protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.
While you can probably think of other contenders, if any case “resembles the walking dead,” it is the recent case of In re Commonwealth Renewable Energy, Inc. In Commonwealth, the court was faced with a motion to dismiss the debtor’s chapter 11 case pursuant to
It is relatively rare when a Circuit Court issues an opinion on the preference defenses under section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is even more unusual when a decision examines the fact-focused “ordinary course” defense under section 547(c)(2). The ordinary course defense shields payments determined to have been made in the “ordinary course of business” of both the debtor and the creditor.
Ever since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Insurance Co. in 1928, it has been well-settled that a policyholder can compromise a disputed claim with its insurer for less than the full limits of the policy without putting its rights to excess coverage at risk.
On May 16, 2016, the United States Supreme Court in Husky International Electronics v. Ritz held that the phrase “actual fraud” under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code may include fraudulent transfer schemes that were effectuated without a false representation. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that an individual debtor will not be discharged from certain debts to the extent that those debts were obtained by false pretenses, false representations or actual fraud.