Some term loans allow borrowers to redeem debt. But to protect a lender’s expected yield, such loans often impose a “make-whole premium” on redemption. That is, they require compensation to the lender for the borrower’s premature termination of interest payments.

Overturning prior pro-debtor precedent, a federal appeals court recently emphasized that secured lenders are entitled to the benefit of their bargains with defaulting borrowers, by making it easier for lenders to collect default-rate interest from a Chapter 11 debtor under a plan of reorganization. Bankruptcy law has long allowed debtors to pay arrearages under a Chapter 11 plan and thereby reinstate the pre-default terms of their loans.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 28, 2016)

The bankruptcy court enters summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in this 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability action. The plaintiffs had obtained a state court default judgment against the debtor for damages caused to them when the debtor drove to their home and shot one of the plaintiffs and injured the other plaintiff with flying debris. The court holds that collateral estoppel bars the debtor from relitigating the issue of whether the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury to the plaintiffs. Opinion below.

Judge: Wise

The In re Tempnology LLC bankruptcy case in New Hampshire has produced yet another important decision involving trademarks and Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code. This time the decision is from the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (“BAP”). Although the BAP’s Section 365(n) discussion is interesting, even more significant is its holding on the impact of rejection of a trademark license.

On November 28, 2016, Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court ruled on a motion for relief from the automatic stay (we she treated as a motion for relief from the discharge injunction) in the Altegrity bankruptcy, Case No. 15-10226. The “Opinion” is available here. The Opinion was issued following legal argument and, by agreement of the parties, based only upon undisputed facts. Opinion at *1.

In early November, the Ninth Circuit held in In re New Investments, Inc. that a debtor was required to “cure” defaults to an agreement using a post-default interest rate, overturning its prior, decades-old decision In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., which had held that a debtor could cure agreements at pre-default interest rates.

Background

In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to "cure" a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a substantial majority of courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law. See, e.g., JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v.

On November 17, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a highly-anticipated ruling in the chapter 11 reorganization of Energy Future Holdings Corp. ("EFH") invalidating one of the aspects of EFH's confirmed chapter 11 plan. In Del. Tr. Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC, the Third Circuit reversed lower court rulings disallowing the claims of EFH's noteholders for make-whole premiums allegedly due under their indentures.

The Sixth Circuit affirms the 2015 consent order specifying the manner in which certain provisions of the confirmed Chapter 11 plan would apply to a class of claim holders. The Korean Claimants objected, arguing that the district court lacked authority to enter the consent order and that the consent order was an impermissible modification of the distribution agreement. The court holds that the court had the requisite authority to enter the consent order and it merely clarified the distribution agreement rather than modified it. Opinion below.

Judge: Kethledge