The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a bank’s relationship with a software services company, under which the software services company required its customers to use the bank for the depositary services ancillary to the software, did not violate anti-tying provisions of the federal Bank Holding Company Act, at 12 U.S.C. § 1972.
The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.
A Virginia bankruptcy court recently ruled that an objection to a proof of claim was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata when an order of confirmation was entered prior to the objection being filed.In re Haskins, No. 15-60644 (W.D. Va. Jan. 27, 2017) [Dkt No.
On Friday, February 3, 2017, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Finding of Violation (FOV) against B Whale Corporation, a Member of the TMT Group of Shipping Companies, (BWC) for alleged violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). The surprise in the announcement was the unique basis on which OFAC asserted jurisdiction over BWC, a non-U.S.
Post-judgment interest is not something most lenders consider when making a loan. In fact, it is not ordinarily the subject of significant analysis even when litigation becomes necessary. Where the United States District Court is the preferred venue, however, parties easily can fall into the quandary of being stuck with the federal statutory post-judgment interest rate, which is currently less than 1% per annum.
On January 6, 2017, Judge Robert D. Drain of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York orally approved a prepackaged plan of reorganization (a “Prepack”) in In re Roust Corporation, et al. (Case No. 16-23786), only seven days after Roust Corporation (“Roust Corp”) and two of its affiliates, CEDC Finance Corporation LLC (“CEDC Finco”) and CEDC Finance Corporation International, Inc. (together with Roust Corp, the “Debtors”), filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11.
Another bankruptcy trustee catches another hapless college unaware. In Roach v. Skidmore College (In re Dunston), Bankr. S.D. Ga. (Jan 31, 2017), a trustee appears to win the next battle of “bankruptcy estates v. child’s college,” ruling that an insolvent parent who paid the college tuition of an adult child made a fraudulent transfer to the college.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that “escrow funds, insurance proceeds, or miscellaneous proceeds” are protected by the anti-modification provisions for Chapter 13 bankruptcies as “incidental property” under the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in the federal Bankruptcy Code.
There are numerous reasons why a company might use more than one entity for its operations or organization: to silo liabilities, for tax advantages, to accommodate a lender, or for general organizational purposes. Simply forming a separate entity, however, is not enough. Corporate formalities must be followed or a court could effectively collapse the separate entities into one. A recent opinion by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Lassman v.
Earlier this month, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Delaware Bankruptcy Court”) released an update to the Local Rules for the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Delaware (Effective February 1, 2017) (the “Local Rules”). According to Local Rule 1001-1(e), the 2017 version of the Local Rules governs all cases or proceedings filed after February 1, 2017, and also applies to proceedings pending on the effective date, except to the extent that the Court finds that it would not be feasible or would work an injustice.