A majority of today’s large Chapter 11 cases are structured as quick Section 363 sales of all the debtor’s assets followed by confirmation of a plan of liquidation, dismissal of the case, or a conversion to a Chapter 7. The purchaser in the sale is often one of the debtor’s prepetition secured or undersecured lenders, which may also act as the debtor-inpossession (DIP) lender and purchase the debtor’s assets through a credit bid, with no cash consideration.

Two courts have added to the murky case law addressing a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover a debtor’s tuition payments for their children. In Geltzer v. Oberlin College, et al., 2018 WL 6333588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018), a New York Bankruptcy Judge permitted a trustee to claw back payments that parents made to their financially independent adult children for college-related costs. In Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School, et al., 2018 WL 6182502 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.

On December 3, the First Circuit (Judges Torruella, Thompson and Kayatta) heard another appeal emanating from the much-litigated federal Promesa legislation enacted in 2016 addressing Puerto Rico’s restructuring (i.e., essentially bankruptcy). A LOT of money is involved – Puerto Rico’s public debt exceeds $70 billion. So each side brought out big guns. You may have heard of two lawyers arguing in this matter: Ted Olson and Donald Verrilli. Here’s the argument.

Almost every year amendments are made to the rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The amendments address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. The rule amendments are ultimately adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court and technically subject to Congressional disapproval.

“… Ponzi scheme payments to satisfy legitimate antecedent debts to defendant banks could not be avoided” by a bankruptcy trustee “absent transaction-specific proof of actual intent to defraud or the statutory elements of constructive fraud – transfer by an insolvent debtor who did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on Nov. 20, 2018. Stoebner v. Opportunity Finance LLC, 2018 WL 6055636 at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2018), citing Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W. 2d 638, 653-56 (Minn. 2015).

The Sears bankruptcy case made headlines this month in the complex world of credit default swaps (CDS). A credit default swap is a contract pursuant to which the seller receives payment from a buyer in exchange for which the seller must compensate the buyer in the event of a default or other specified credit event.

The first of three compliance deadlines for US regulations requiring resolution-related amendments to qualified financial contracts is January 1, 2019, and delaying compliance until the subsequent deadlines creates additional risk. Compliance programs may not be able to eliminate this risk due to the scope of contracts to be remediated and the staggered compliance period that looks back to the first compliance date.

The Supreme Court of the United States granted Mission Product Holdings’ petition for certiorari to determine whether a debtor-licensor can terminate the rights of trademark licensees by rejecting its trademark licensing agreements as part of its bankruptcy case. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, Case No. 17-1657 (Supr. Ct. Oct. 26, 2018). The specific question presented is:

Trademark licensing is a driving force in business relationships. One common example is where one business owns a trademark, which it licenses out to other companies who manufacture and sell the products bearing the mark. But, what happens if the trademark owner goes bankrupt? Bankruptcy law gives a debtor the right to “reject” contracts to free itself of obligations, but if a trademark owner/licensor “rejects” a trademark license agreement, how does that affect the trademark licensee?

The US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a fraudulent conveyance claim for a “blocking right” and right of first refusal under a patent transfer agreement, addressing the district court’s proper exclusion of expert testimony on whether the debtor was insolvent at the time of the relevant transfer. In re: Teltronics, Inc., Case No. 16-16140 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) (Kaplan, J).