A series of related decisions issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the ongoing Fairfield Sentry U.S. redeemer litigation — Fairfield Sentry II,1Fairfield Sentry III,2 and Fairfield Sentry IV3 — provide insight into, among other things, the interplay between the safe harbor provision of section 546(e)4 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Safe Harbor”) and chapter 15.
Introduction
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)1The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.2
When a court reaches a decision in a case, the law of the case doctrine generally provides that parties should not be able to relitigate the same issue in that case, and for the court to adhere to its prior decision.1 The doctrine does not, however, apply to every decision a court reaches. Two recent decisions by Judge Elizabeth Stong in the Brizinova chapter 7 cases in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York explore when the doctrine may or may not apply in bankruptcy cases.
Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code grants secured creditors the right to credit bid up to the full amount of their claim as a form of currency to bid to purchase assets securing their claim from a debtor in connection with a stand-alone sale of assets under section 363(b). In a recent opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Aerogroup International, Inc., Judge Kevin J.
Good news: structured dismissals have survived Supreme Court scrutiny. Bad news: dismissals may be harder to structure, given yesterday’s 6-2 decision overruling the Third Circuit in Jevic narrowing the context in which they can be approved. We now have guidance on whether or not structured dismissals must follow the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. The short answer is that they must.
Since Marblegate was decided in 2014, the only court to address claims under §316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in the context of a corporate restructuring transaction is
A decision from the United States Supreme Court penned by Justice Sonia Sotomayor adopted a broad reading of “actual fraud” in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from discharge debts “obtained by . . .
A recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas caught our eye because of the unconventional opening line:
“Summers are hot in Texas, so pools are a hot item. But not hot enough to help a pool installer [ . . . ] avoid bankruptcy” – Judge Tony M. Davis, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
Although our Blog focuses more on corporate restructuring issues than individual bankruptcies, the discharge of student loan debt is a topic that seems to be an exception to that rule (see The Eternal Pursuit to Collect: Due Process Rights and Actions to Collect on a Debtor’s Defaulted Student Loans,