Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides special protection for tenants if a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor was the lessor by giving the tenant the option of retaining possession of the leased premises. Although the provision clearly describes what rights a tenant has if it makes such an election, it does not unequivocally address the extent of the electing tenant's obligations under the rejected lease or any related agreements. The U.S.

On June 22, 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") issued an order concluding that FERC and the U.S. bankruptcy courts have concurrent jurisdiction to review and address the disposition of natural gas transportation agreements that a debtor seeks to reject under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.).

The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).

In Short

The Situation: Jones Day recently represented a group of secured term loan and revolver lenders in the global restructuring of syncreon Group B.V. ("syncreon")—a leading provider of logistics services with over 14,000 employees across more than 100 facilities located in 20 countries around the world.

In December 2018, at its 54th session in Vienna, Working Group V (Insolvency Law) of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) discussed revisions to its Enterprise Group Insolvency: Draft Model Law (the "EGI Model Law") as well as the EGI Model Law’s Guide to Enactment.

In In re Avanti Commc'ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018), Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code enforcing a scheme of arrangement sanctioned by a court in England that included nonconsensual third-party releases. Judge Glenn determined that such releases should be recognized and enforced consistent with principles of "comity" and cooperation with foreign courts inherent under chapter 15.

In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.

In Feltman v. Noor Staffing Grp., LLC (In re Corp. Res. Servs. Inc.), 564 B.R. 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017), the bankruptcy court considered whether section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a right of setoff when no such right is available under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The court concluded that section 553 does not create an independent federal right of setoff, but merely preserves any such right that exists under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

An important aspect of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 ("PROMESA")—the temporary stay of creditor collection efforts that came into effect upon its enactment—was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Peaje Investments LLC v. García-Padilla, 845 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2017), the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a lower court order denying two motions for relief from the PROMESA stay.

In its highly anticipated Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. decision,[1] the U.S.