The nearly $350 billion loan program made available to small businesses by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act was tapped out in less than two weeks. In response to this overwhelming demand, on Friday, April 24, 2020, an additional $320 billion was funded into the loan program, and the second round of applications for small businesses requesting these loans will open on Monday, April 27, 2020.
In Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy law does not disallow a post-petition unsecured claim for attorney’s fees to the extent such claim is authorized by a pre-petition contract and not otherwise expressly disallowed. That pronouncement should have stopped all future litigation over the issue. That has not been the case.
A majority of today’s large Chapter 11 cases are structured as quick Section 363 sales of all the debtor’s assets followed by confirmation of a plan of liquidation, dismissal of the case, or a conversion to a Chapter 7. The purchaser in the sale is often one of the debtor’s prepetition secured or undersecured lenders, which may also act as the debtor-inpossession (DIP) lender and purchase the debtor’s assets through a credit bid, with no cash consideration.
Certain licensees of intellectual property are expressly given expanded rights when their licensors file bankruptcy. But what about trademark licensees? Trademarks are not among the defined categories of “intellectual property” for bankruptcy purposes. Nonetheless, are trademark licensees otherwise protected in a licensor bankruptcy? Unfortunately for these licensees, a recent circuit court decision put the brakes on attempts to expand protection to licensees of trademarks.
Do a lessee’s possessory interests in real property survive a “free and clear” sale of the property under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code? In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said “no,” holding that section 365(h) did not protect the interest of the lessee in the context of a section 363 sale when there had been no prior formal rejection of the lease under section 365.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued is highly awaited ruling in Czyzewski et al. v. Jevic Holding Corp. et al. The Jevic case presented the question whether bankruptcy courts may approve non-consensual structured dismissals that vary the distribution scheme established by the Bankruptcy Code.
The concept of “equitable mootness” is a doctrine of relatively long-standing in bankruptcy jurisprudence. It has been used by courts to avoid determination of issues raised on appeal that would require the unscrambling of a plan previously confirmed and implemented. However, that doctrine has recently been questioned in a variety of decisions. It appears that the scope of equitable mootness is clearly ebbing. In that context, a recent decision by this Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provides an opportunity to further examine the doctrine.
Section 1930(a)(6) of Title 28 requires the payment of quarterly fees to the United States Trustee (the “UST”) for each quarter that a bankruptcy case is open. The amount of fees is calculated based on the amount of disbursements made by the debtor during each quarter. But, are these fees payable when a trust, established by a confirmed plan, makes distributions rather than a debtor?
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As noted in prior posts, the Ninth Circuit opened the door, albeit narrowly, to cannabis company bankruptcies when it issued its opinion in Garvin v. Cook Invs. NW on May 2, 2019. In Garvin, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the confirmation of a plan of reorganization proposed by the lessor to a marijuana growing operation.